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Abstract 
We argued as early as 2010, at the outset of the sovereign debt crisis, that Europe needs a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF). In the meantime, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
has been created, which performs the function of an EMF. It was critical in containing the cost 
of the crisis and four of its five country programmes have been a success. But the case of 
Greece shows that one needs to be prepared for failure as well. We propose in this paper to 
keep the ESM essentially as it is, but would empower it to set conditions on countries receiving 
its financial support. Such support would have a limit, however, to prevent situations in which 
the ESM would ‘own’ a country. 
We see the ESM/EMF literally as a financial stability mechanism, whose main function is to 
ensure that a bailout is no longer “alternativlos”, as Chancellor Angela Merkel used to say. In 
2010, the rescue of Greece was presented as TINA (There Is No Alternative) because the 
stability of the financial system of the entire euro area appeared to be in danger. With financial 
stability guaranteed by the ESM/EMF in combination with the Banking Union, default becomes 
an alternative that should be considered dispassionately. Whether the debt of a country is 
sustainable is rarely known with certainty beforehand. Accordingly, it is proper that the Union, 
in the ‘spirit of solidarity’, initially gives a country the benefit of the doubt and provides 
financial support for an adjustment programme. But the exposure of the Union should be 
limited. If the programme goes awry, the ESM/EMF could be of great help, as it could provide 
bridge financing to soften the cost of default.  
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Introduction  
Calling for a ‘European Monetary Fund’ (EMF) has become fashionable. European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker became a convert in his latest State of the Union speech of 
September 13th, and the Commission endorsed this concept in its ‘St Nicolas’ package of 
proposals to improve the governance of the euro area. Several German policy-makers have 
also called for a transformation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into an EMF. 
However, the various advocates of a European Monetary Fund have very different ideas about 
its purpose and functions. We look at the essential functions of an EMF and ask what changes 
would be needed to the ESM in order to improve the functioning of the euro area.  
Since we were among the first to propose the creation of an EMF, we start with a short 
background of this idea. We then turn to how the ESM has performed so far and sketch the 
(limited) changes we regard as essential.  
1. The history 
When we first published our proposal for an EMF in February 2010, Greece was still struggling 
on its own to avoid default. Following the revelation of a much higher government budget 
deficit in 2009 than earlier expected, 10-year government bond yields had increased from 
4.5% in August 2009 to 6.1% in January 2010. Although the prospects for Greece being able 
to roll forward maturing debt in the market were slim, our proposal met widespread rejection. 
Most people felt that EU institutions were unable to agree on financial support for a country 
at risk of default in view of the no-bailout clause enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. Treaty 
change was seen as impossible, and our proposal was seen at best as a project for the distant 
future. 
Two months later, however, things had moved on very fast. On Sunday, 2 May 2010, Greece 
received its first support programme, with the funds coming from bilateral loans from other 
economic and monetary union (EMU) countries. But the moved failed to calm markets, and 
market participants lost confidence in the liquidity and solvency of other EMU countries. This 
prompted the European Council (in this case the meeting of the heads of state and 
government of the euro-area states) on the following Sunday, 9 May, to create a €500 billion 
fund dubbed the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to be able to give support to a 
broader group of countries. 
Because the EFSF needed time to be organised, on the same day the European Central Bank 
(ECB) launched a government bond purchase programme, dubbed the Securities Markets 
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Programme, with a view to bolstering the sagging prices of bonds issued by euro-area 
governments. The EFSF was originally foreseen to be temporary, but the evolution of the crisis, 
with Portugal and Ireland needing funding (and the Greek programme not succeeding) 
showed that there was a need for a permanent structure to help countries in temporary 
financial difficulties. The EFSF was then de facto merged into the permanent ESM in late 2012. 
In the summer of that year, the crisis seemed to spread to two large countries, Italy and Spain. 
At this point, it appeared that the entire euro area was in danger of dissolving. This prompted 
the president of the ECB to assert that his institution would do ‘whatever it takes’ to prevent 
a disintegration of the euro. Financial market tension then abated rapidly and the ECB 
replaced the Securities Markets Programme with the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) 
Programme (in September 2012).  
The OMT has since been widely credited as providing an indispensable safety net. But in 
reality, the activation of the OMT (under which the ECB would buy only short-term 
government bonds) is subject to the conclusion of an ESM programme. The purpose of the 
OMT was not to substitute the ECB for the ESM, but to ensure the credibility of the euro area 
as a whole when the stability of the entire area is in danger. In such a situation, the resources 
of the ESM would clearly be insufficient. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is likewise 
responsible for providing adjustment financing for individual countries, but its resources 
would not be sufficient to deal with a European financial crisis. In short, while in early 2010 a 
European Monetary Fund seemed to be utopic, it has come de facto into existence since late 
2012. 
2. The original idea 
Our initial blueprint (Gros and Mayer, 2010) was, of course, very much affected by what was 
then the key problem, namely the case of Greece. We addressed five main issues: 
1) Financing mechanism. We envisaged capital contributions to the EMF based on the 
potential risk a country represents to the EMU. Hence, we proposed that countries 
breaching the Maastricht criteria would make higher contributions based on the excess 
of their public debt and deficit ratios above 60% and 3% of GDP, respectively. We 
expected that our mechanism would create a capital base of €120 billion over time, 
which could be leveraged to a funding capacity of at least €500 billion through 
borrowing.  
2) Conditionality. We thought that there should be two stages. In stage I any EMF member 
could call on the capital (and cumulated interest) it had subscribed – possibly in the form 
of an EMF guarantee of new issues of public debt, provided its fiscal adjustment 
programme was approved by the Eurogroup. In stage II, use of assistance from the EMF 
greater than the capital subscription would be dependent upon a tailor-made 
adjustment programme supervised by the European Commission and the Eurogroup. 
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3) Enforcement. If a country did not live up to its commitments, new financial assistance 
would be cut off. A continuing breach of conditions would lead to cut-offs from 
structural funds and, in the event, from the euro area’s money market as the public debt 
of the offending country would no longer be eligible as collateral for ECB funds under a 
repurchase agreement. 
4) Orderly default. We felt that one needed to recognise that default is possible. For this 
to be the case, the costs of default would have to be contained. If a country cannot make 
the necessary adjustment effort, it would be in everybody’s interest to cut the debt 
burden. To make restructuring possible, we suggested the Brady bond model, whereby 
bad debt is exchanged against safe debt backed by the EMF with a haircut.1 We thought 
that the size of the haircut should be such that it would bring down the debt ratio of the 
country in question to the Maastricht limit of 60%. In return for exchanging bad debt 
against safe debt, we suggested that the EMF acquire all claims against the defaulting 
country. From that time onwards, any additional funds the country received could be 
used only for specific purposes approved by the EMF. Other EU transfer payments would 
also be disbursed by the EMF under strict scrutiny, or they could be used to pay down 
the debt owed by the defaulting country to the EMF. Thus, the EMF would provide a 
framework for sovereign bankruptcy comparable to the Chapter 11 procedure in the US 
for bankrupt companies that qualify for restructuring. Without such a procedure for 
orderly bankruptcy, the Community could be taken hostage by a country unwilling to 
adjust, threatening to trigger a systemic crisis if financial assistance is not forthcoming. 
5) Exit. Since member states of the EU remain sovereign countries, we acknowledged that 
a defaulting country could regard such intrusion into its policies by the EMF as a violation 
of its sovereignty and hence unacceptable. But an E(M)U member country that refused 
to accept the decisions of the EMF would of course lose access to financing from the 
EMF and would then have the choice between introducing capital controls or leaving 
the euro. At the same time, its debt towards the EMF would continue to exist and would 
have to be serviced anyway. If a country did not do this and refused all cooperation, its 
membership of the EU would be called into question.2  
We will discuss the extent to which these concerns have been addressed after a brief analysis 
of the experience so far. 
                                                     
1 The Brady plan offered two options: i) exiting for those investors willing to take a haircut, and ii) remaining 
invested, but in this case also providing fresh money. In the Brady plan, the reduced principal amount was 
partially collateralised by specially issued US Treasury 30-year zero-coupon bonds purchased by the debtor 
country using a combination of IMF, World Bank and the country’s own foreign currency reserves. Accordingly, 
we expected the debt of the defaulting country after the haircut to be collateralised by EMF guarantees. 
2 In extreme cases it could effectively be thrown out by recourse to Art. 60 of the Vienna Convention on 
International Treaties, or Art. 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon could be invoked. 
4  GROS & MAYER 
 
3. The experience so far 
The track record of the five adjustment programmes the ESM (and its predecessors) have 
undertaken is mixed.  
Four of the five rescue programmes have already ended, and could be described as a qualified 
success. The financing difficulties of Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus turned out, ex post, to be 
temporary (although these countries continue to depend on low interest rates due to their 
high levels of debt), and the recapitalisation of the Spanish banking system was not so 
expensive. These adjustment programmes have of course been widely criticised as being too 
harsh – a criticism levelled against most IMF programmes. There is no need to take a stance 
on this issue here. What matters is that the financing of the ESM avoided three further defaults 
(and in the case of the small programme for Spain alleviated that fear considerably). The ESM 
hence performed the standard function of a ‘European Monetary Fund’.  
The political cost of even these ‘successful’ cases has been high. The financial assistance 
packages are not remembered for what they prevented (insolvency and financial collapse), 
but for the perceived cost of the ‘austerity’ in terms of incomes, employment and output. As 
William Shakespeare remarked centuries ago, lending is an ungrateful business, as the lender 
risks losing both the friendship and his money. 3 
The one case that is almost universally regarded as a failure is that of Greece. The country 
obtained considerable debt relief but still needed three programmes of ever-increasing 
amounts, and there is little sign even today of a sustained recovery. In the following analysis 
we will concentrate on the Greek case and ask what features of the ESM framework might be 
changed to prevent similar problems in future. Before this, we check to what extent actual 
developments have been in line with our earlier recommendations. 
4. Similarities and differences 
When we compare our early blueprint with what has been created so far, we find a 
considerable number of differences, as presented below. 
1) Financing mechanism. While we envisaged financial contributions based on the 
potential risk a country represents to the EMU (e.g. its debt level), contributions to the 
ESM are based on countries’ shares of the capital of the ECB (the simple average of the 
respective country’s shares in the total population and GDP of the euro area). Applying 
the ECB’s capital keys to the ESM has had the effect that smaller countries, potentially 
more exposed to the risk of sudden stops in cross-border financial flows, also have 
smaller capital shares in the ESM. This is obviously inconsistent with the key principle of 
insurance, where contributions to a common pool are not only based on the size of the 
risks covered, but also the exposure of the insured to these risks. 
                                                     
3 - “For loan oft loses both itself and friend” (Hamlet, edited by A. Thompson and N. Taylor, Arden Shakespeare, 
3rd series, London: Thomson Learning, 2006). 
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2) Conditionality. Comparable to our two-stage model for access to funds and the 
associated conditionality, the ESM offers several stages of access, ranging from 
precautionary credit lines and the purchase of bonds of a member state in primary and 
secondary markets to adjustment loans. In addition, the ESM can also lend to member 
states for the purpose of recapitalising insolvent banks and under certain conditions 
recapitalise these entities directly. All financial assistance by the ESM comes with policy 
conditions specified in a memorandum of understanding agreed with the European 
Commission, the ECB and (where applicable) the IMF. So far, so good. However, the 
involvement of the ECB in the design and monitoring of financial assistance is 
problematic, as it blurs the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy. Moreover, 
the continuing involvement of the IMF in intra-EMU affairs cannot be taken for granted, 
given the institution’s global mandate and shareholder base. Finally yet importantly, the 
European Commission’s new understanding of its role as a “political commission” (as it 
was described by Jean-Claude Juncker) is incompatible with the job of designing and 
monitoring conditional financial assistance (where political aspects ought to be 
minimised). 
3) Enforcement. Contrary to our idea of a strict enforcement of the conditions for financial 
assistance, the bodies entrusted with the monitoring of assistance (the so-called Troika, 
consisting of the ECB, IMF and the Commission) have shown considerable leniency 
(although this is generally perceived very differently in the programme countries). 
Repeated non-compliance has been met with base drift or a watering down of the 
benchmarks. Not all of it has been the result of policy slippage in the programme 
countries. Some of the benchmarks were impossible to reach because, at least at the 
start, the underlying economic assumptions (notably on exports and growth) were much 
too optimistic. In the case of Greece, for example, the result was that after much delay 
the country reached most fiscal targets and passed most reforms. But it also became 
apparent that while the Greek government and parliament could be pressured to pass 
all the laws and regulations demanded by the creditors, it proved impossible to reform 
the administration, whose inefficiency and obstruction had in many cases the result that 
few structural reforms were actually implemented.  
4) Orderly default. As already mentioned, Greece benefited in March 2012 from a €107 
billion debt reduction, equivalent to a 53.5% haircut on the principal value of about 97% 
of outstanding bonds held by private sector creditors (€197 billion).4 Yet, the process 
leading up to this result was anything but orderly. The announcement in late 2011 by 
the French and the German leaders that some form of haircut would be considered 
greatly unsettled financial markets. 
5) Private sector involvement. The EFSF supported the restructuring in a way similar to the 
earlier Brady plan. In the so-called private sector involvement (PSI) facility, Greece 
                                                     
4 Bonds held by official creditors, notably bonds acquired by the ECB under its Securities Markets Programme, 
were exempted from restructuring. 
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offered investors one- and two-year EFSF bonds. These EFSF bonds, provided to holders 
of bonds under Greek law, were subsequently rolled over into longer maturities. In the 
bond interest facility, Greece offered investors EFSF six-month bills in order to enable it 
to repay accrued interest on outstanding Greek sovereign bonds under Greek law that 
were included in the PSI. The bills were also subsequently rolled over into longer 
maturities. The operation largely followed the pattern we had envisaged. Still, although 
the debt reduction of €107 billion amounted to 56% of nominal GDP at the end of the 
second quarter of 2012, the actual debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of the year was only 12 
percentage points lower than before the debt reduction (160% of GDP at the end of 
2012 versus 172% at the end of 2011). This stemmed from a number of reasons. First of 
all, the headline debt reduction of €107 billion is misleading, since the approximately 
€60 billion of debt held by Greek banks was nominally cut into half, but the EFSF then 
had to immediately lend the Greek government €30 billion to recapitalise the banks. 
Moreover, even in 2012 the Greek government was still running a sizeable deficit, which 
needed to be financed from external sources. On top of this, the ‘sweeteners’ provided 
to some investors in the PSI operation also increased the debt of Greece towards the 
EFSF. Finally, nominal GDP continued to decline, thus increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
To achieve a more substantial debt reduction without imposing an even greater haircut 
on private creditors, official creditors would have had to participate in the exercise. Their 
refusal to do so was one of the reasons that the exercise failed and the sacrifice of the 
private creditors was in vain. 
6) Make failure possible? At the conclusion of their crisis meeting on 21 July 2011, the 
European Council members stated:  
As far as our general approach to private sector involvement in the euro area is 
concerned, we would like to make it clear that Greece requires an exceptional 
and unique solution. All other euro countries solemnly reaffirm their inflexible 
determination to honour fully their own individual sovereign signature and all 
their commitments to sustainable fiscal conditions and structural reforms. 
This statement may have been necessary to calm markets after the announcement of 
Greece’s partial default, but it also seemed to close the window for any further, orderly, 
public debt restructuring in the euro area. Fortunately, European Council Conclusions 
have no direct legal power. Moreover, the statement is sufficiently ambiguous. It does 
not say that defaults should never occur again, only that “Greece requires an exceptional 
and unique solution”. Future defaults will certainly be different and require a different 
“unique solution”.  
7) Exit. As we expected, populations in crisis countries regarded the intrusion into their 
policies by the euro-area crisis management as a violation of their sovereignty and hence 
resisted this strongly. Greece twice came close to exiting the EMU. In 2012 and 2015, 
the idea of creating a Greek parallel currency to the euro was considered by the Greek 
government. And during the negotiations of a third assistance programme in 2015, the 
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German finance minister proposed to the Council of Ministers a temporary exit of 
Greece from the EMU. According to press reports, apart from Greece itself, the German 
proposal was opposed by France, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg. It was finally dropped at 
the following meeting of the European Council. But the idea of exiting the euro (or that 
of introducing a parallel currency) has not died. It is still actively discussed by major 
political figures in Italy, for example. 
In sum, both the crisis management and design of crisis-management institutions have been 
overshadowed by deep – one could even say “philosophical” – differences of opinion about 
the role of discretionary policy and contractually agreed rules (Brunnermeier et al., 2016). This 
often resulted in poor compromises, which rendered a resolute solution of the crises more 
difficult, and left many market participants confused and sceptical about the survival of the 
euro. It eventually took the de facto guarantee of the ECB to use its unlimited monetary 
firepower to defend the euro to calm markets. There is nonetheless a general consensus that 
the intervention of the ECB can only be of a temporary nature. To put EMU on a firm footing, 
more comprehensive institutional changes are required. 
Experience has shown that a public debt crisis can arise from two sources: i) overspending by 
the government itself, and ii) a financial boom–bust cycle that leads to a deep recession and 
forces the government to bail out its banks. Greece and Ireland represent the two archetypal 
cases. In principle, there are now mechanisms that should make both less likely. The provisions 
of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which require a high level of capital 
(approximately 8% of the balance sheet) that can be ‘bailed in’ before public sector support is 
needed, should already drastically reduce the burden of future financial crises for public 
finances.5 Moreover, the common funding for bank restructuring available from the ‘Single 
Resolution Fund’ would further reduce, perhaps even eliminate in most cases, the need for 
national governments to provide financial support for their banks.6 
The Fiscal Compact mandates a continuous reduction in debt-to-GDP ratios, which should 
significantly diminish the probability of future public-finance excesses. Theoretically, the need 
for EMF assistance should likewise diminish over time. In practice, however, implementation 
of the Fiscal Compact has remained patchy. We therefore concentrate on the analysis of the 
first type of crisis, hoping that it will at least have become less likely, thanks to whatever 
limited effect the existing fiscal rules have. 
                                                     
5 - Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014. 
6 De Groen & Gros (2015) show that the Single Resolution Fund would have been enough to cover the need for 
bank restructuring funding during the euro crisis had the BRRD rules been strictly applied. 
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5. What we would now do differently 
As the idea of a European Monetary Fund has made it back onto the agenda for the completion 
of EMU, we thought it worth asking what we would change to our earlier proposal with the 
benefit of hindsight. Here are the main points: 
1) Limiting financing. To avoid turning a crisis-assistance facility into a scheme for 
permanent transfers, and subsequent dependency, as has de facto happened for 
Greece, financial assistance should be limited. The IMF has recently adopted access 
limits for its own lending, which imply that under ordinary circumstances financial 
assistance is limited to five times the quota the country has in the IMF. A similar limit 
seems appropriate for the ESM/EMF. That being stated, IMF quotas are determined 
somewhat differently from those of the ESM. Quotas in the ESM are the same as those 
in the ECB, which are an equally weighted mix of GDP and population. This corresponds 
closely to the most important element in the quota formula of the IMF, which assigns a 
weight of 50% to GDP, 30% to openness and 15% to economic variability. The latter two 
factors are very much related to country size: smaller countries are typically more open 
and are often more exposed to shocks for the simple reason that small economies are 
less diversified. To capture differences in risk exposure one might modify the overall 
access rule of five times the ESM quota by increasing the ‘multiplier’ for small countries 
to seven (times the ESM quota) and reducing it also to three times for the very large 
countries.  
Table A1 in Appendix 1 shows the resulting access limits, together with actual ESM 
funding in the five programmes that were undertaken. Had this key been applied to the 
programme countries, the assistance to Greece would have been many times larger than 
the actual ESM provided to the country. For Spain and Cyprus, our proposed limits would 
not have been a constraint. The assistance to Ireland and Portugal would have been 
above the limit if one combines IMF and ESM funding. If one deducts the financial 
assistance used for bank recapitalisation, the Ireland and Portugal programmes would 
have been considerably smaller and our proposed access limits would not have been 
binding. In the case of Ireland, €24 billion of the total assistance of €67.5 billion was used 
for bank recapitalisation, leaving €43.5 billion for fiscal support (equivalent to 110% of 
our proposed access limit). Notably, part of the fiscal support had become necessary 
because the Irish government had already injected €46 billion into the banking sector 
beforehand. Had the government not stepped in to bail out bank creditors, it is doubtful 
whether Ireland would have needed financial assistance at all. In the case of Portugal, 
€12 billion of the total assistance of €78 billion was used for bank recapitalisation, 
leaving €66 billion for fiscal support (106% of our proposed access limit). Thus, without 
the additional bank recapitalisation, our proposed access limit would have allowed for 
providing assistance of roughly the size granted for fiscal support. As mentioned above, 
in future, national funding for bank recapitalisation should no longer be needed given 
the bail-in rules of the BRRD and the Single Resolution Fund. The need for financial 
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assistance to governments should be considerably reduced once the Single Resolution 
Fund becomes fully operational, which will be the case soon. 
2) Conditionality. With hindsight, the various stages of access to ESM assistance would 
also seem appropriate for the EMF. However, design and monitoring of adjustment 
would have to be given to a European institution at arms’ length of politics. Therefore, 
the EMF would have to develop its own capacity to monitor economic developments 
and implement adjustment programmes (although the European Commission will 
continue to play a role in economic monitoring as enshrined in the EU Treaties). With 
access to financial assistance limited, the length of programmes should also be limited 
to, say, three years (in line with standard IMF practice). To avoid the substitution of 
private debt by public debt during the programme, debt service payments would need 
to be suspended for the duration of the adjustment programme (see also appendix 1). 
The governance structure of the ESM would seem to be appropriate to task ESM staff 
with programme design and monitoring, and the board of directors with approval of 
staff decisions. The roles of the ECB, IMF and Eurogroup would become redundant. 
3) Enforcement. Enforcement of conditionality has been too weak. Hence, we would 
reiterate our proposal that new financial assistance would be cut off if a country did not 
live up to its commitments. A continuing breach of conditions should lead to cut-offs 
from structural funds and, in the event, from the euro area’s money market, as the 
public debt of the offending country should no longer be eligible as collateral for ECB 
funds under a repurchase agreement (which implies that there would be capital and 
exchange controls). Emergency lending assistance to banks by national central banks 
should be abolished. 
4) Orderly default. In line with our earlier proposal, we think that a country should 
restructure its public debt if the size and length of the adjustment programme is not 
enough to bring the country back to the market. The Brady bond model and the Greek 
version of it still seem appropriate to us, and we continue to think that the size of the 
haircut should be such that the debt ratio of the country in question declines to the 
Maastricht limit of 60%. In return for exchanging bad debt against safe debt, the EMF 
should receive all claims against the defaulting country. From that time onwards, any 
additional official funds the country received could be used only for specific purposes 
approved by the EMF. Other EU transfer payments would also be disbursed by the EMF 
under strict scrutiny, or they could be used to pay down the debt owed by the defaulting 
country to the EMF. 
5) Exit. If both financial assistance and debt restructuring failed to create financial stability 
and the respective country were cut off from all further assistance from the EMF, it 
should be able to reintroduce its own currency, exclusively or in parallel to the euro, 
without having to leave the EU. The above regulation of structural funds and other EU 
transfers would still apply (see also Appendix 2). 
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The European Commission recently published its own proposal of a European Monetary Fund. 
It differs from our scheme in several respects: First, the Commission proposal introduces a 
“reinforced qualified majority” voting procedure to speed up decisions. We are not aware that 
the existing voting procedure prevented timely assistance when needed. Second, the 
Commission intends to establish the EMF as a Community institution with strong Commission 
involvement instead of an intergovernmental institution. In our view, this is inconsistent with 
the character of the EMF as a non-political institution and the Commission’s declared intention 
to be “political”. Third, the Commission wants to develop new financial instruments within the 
EMF. We do not see a scarcity of Community financial instruments and prefer a clear focus of 
the EMF. Fourth, the Commission proposal omits a sovereign debt restructuring and EMU exit 
scheme. We believe both are necessary as error correction mechanisms in a world governed 
by uncertainty. The Commission also wants to have the EMF act as a common backstop to the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF). We would find it consistent with our model of the ESM as a 
lender of last resort for official entities, including the SRF. In a large crisis it is likely that many 
assets are underpriced, and hence it is likely that the SRF would be able to repay a loan from 
the EMF not only from future fees of banks but also from profits on bank assets it has acquired 
in the crisis. 
Our revamped outline for the EMF would strengthen incentives for establishing sound public 
and private finances in EMU member states and reduce the need to rely on the ECB in 
maintaining the EMU. It would also respect the principle of no bailout still enshrined in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union much more clearly than the present 
arrangements (which have been subject to numerous legal cases). Nothing in life is 
irreversible, not even entry into the EMU, and defaults on promises to pay are a fact of life in 
a market economy. If one accepts this and prepares for the consequences, the ECB would no 
longer be needed as a quasi-fiscal agent and could concentrate on its original mission, namely 
to issue money with a stable purchasing power (or ‘inner value’) for the citizens of the 
monetary union. 
6. Concluding considerations 
The successful rescue programmes of the ESM have shown the value of having a lender of last 
resort for solvent, but illiquid governments. The case of Greece has also shown that solvency 
and liquidity are very hard to distinguish. 
In concluding, we would like stress another consideration that emerges from the euro crisis. 
When the financial system of the entire area is in danger governments feel that they have no 
choice but to bail out even governments that are very likely to be insolvent. Moreover, they 
and the EU institutions will even pressure national governments to accept a bailout in order 
to limit financial instability. This makes it difficult to impose conditions and increases the 
political costs for both creditors and debtors, as both feel that they are not acting in their own 
interests. 
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Our central consideration is thus that the key purpose of an EMF should be to ensure the 
stability of the financial system of the euro to limit the negative spill-overs from the potential 
financing difficulties of any individual member state (see Tirole, 2015 and Farhi and Tirole 
2017). This is essential, not with the punitive intent of ‘establishing market discipline’, but to 
ensure a proper alignment of responsibilities: the Union should not have to bear the cost of 
excessive debt accumulation of member states, which ultimately remain sovereign in their 
fiscal policies (see Schäuble, 2017). 
Member states will face the proper incentives to reduce their debt to sustainable levels only 
if they know that the Union is not forced to bail them out. Since contagion is the way financial 
crises spread, this implies that an EMF should have ample facilities to protect the ‘innocent 
bystanders’, i.e. countries whose finances are sustainable, but which might suddenly 
experience financing difficulties because investors withdraw from an entire group of 
countries. Another way financial crises spread is via the banking system. It is therefore critical 
that the unsustainable debt of a government does not put the euro area’s banking system into 
difficulties. This is of course the purpose of the Banking Union, but given that the resources of 
the Single Resolution Fund are limited, it might be useful to clarify that in case of a large crisis 
the Union will stand behind the institutions of the Banking Union. In other words, in the 
existing credit money order, the Banking Union eventually needs a fiscal backstop (or the 
money order would have to be changed).7 
A financial stability mechanism is thus essential to ensure that a bailout is no longer 
“alternativlos” as Chancellor Angela Merkel used to say. The EMF should create the possibility 
to decide whether to grant financial support to a country that cannot roll its debt because it 
has lost market access. It makes a world of a difference whether, as in 2010, both sides feel 
condemned to a bailout package that neither side likes, or whether there are alternatives. 
Whether the debt of a country is sustainable is rarely known with any certainty beforehand. 
Accordingly, it is proper that the Union, in the ‘spirit of solidarity’, initially gives a country the 
benefit of the doubt and provides financial support for an adjustment programme. But the 
exposure of the Union should be limited. If the programme goes awry, a cut in the debt must 
be considered dispassionately. The EMF could be of great help even if this has become 
unavoidable, as it could provide bridge financing and a framework for negotiations between 
the creditors and the debtor country. 
 
                                                     
7 Banks are licensed to create book money by extending credit. Thus, book money is a private liability of banks 
to their customers and is destroyed if banks fail due to credit losses. Deposit insurance was created to protect 
book money from bank failures. A fiscal backstop is needed in case of systemic banking crises. However, in the 
euro area the strength of government finances varies among countries, and so does the quality of national 
deposit insurance schemes and hence the quality of book money. Without a common fiscal backstop for deposits 
created through credit extension, EMU is no more than a cash union. There have been suggestions to change the 
money order to increase stability (see e.g. the 100% money concept of the Chicago plan of the early 1930s), but 
this is unlikely to happen. 
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Appendix 1. A standstill for debt service during the adjustment programme 
It appears very difficult to limit European Stability Mechanism (ESM) financing for a country 
with high public debt when the country’s debt has not been judged unsustainable at the 
beginning of a programme. Consider the example of a country with a debt-to-GDP ratio close 
to 140% and an average maturity of seven years. With this combination, about 60% of GDP 
will have to be refinanced over the first three years of a potential ESM programme. To this 
one will almost surely have to add some current deficits, which over three years could easily 
add another 10% of GDP. The initial programme could thus require 70% of GDP. 
But this will lead to a situation in which there will be little room for any haircut, should the 
programme not succeed in restoring growth and hence external and fiscal balance. Very short-
term debt, which is almost never subject to a haircut, typically amounts to about 15% of total 
debt, and would in this case likely be worth 20% of GDP.  
The banks of the country concerned might hold another 20% worth of GDP in bonds. This debt 
cannot be cut either, because that would destroy the financial system of the country (and any 
chances of success of the programme).  
On top of this, one has to consider any holdings of home country public debt by the national 
central bank. The bonds held by the central bank (acquired for example, under the Public 
Sector Purchase Programme of the ECB) might be formally subject to a haircut (as long as the 
national central bank does not hold a blocking minority). But this does not help because the 
national central bank is part of the national public sector and any losses it incurs could fall 
back on the government anyway. 
The remaining ‘haircuttable’ debt could consequently be reduced to only about 20-30% of 
GDP after three years of a programme. The general corollary to these illustrative calculations 
is that there might be little room left if a highly indebted country is fully refinanced even over 
only a few years. 
Something along these lines was also the case in Greece, where officially €200 billion in debt 
instruments could be made subject to the private sector involvement (PSI) operation. Very 
short-term debt (and that held by the ECB) was excluded. But the holdings of the Greek banks 
(and insurance companies) comprised a large part of the €200 billion and they had to be 
refinanced by the ESM in order to keep the Greek banking system afloat. Only about €100 
billion of bonds still held by international investors were effectively subject to the PSI, which 
reduced them in nominal terms to about €50 billion, resulting in a gain of about 25% of GDP. 
This is actually somewhat better than what one would expect in the example above: the 
country would start with a debt ratio of close to 140%. If 30% remained available for cutting 
this would yield a potential gain (in nominal terms) of about 15% of GDP, or a new debt ratio 
of 125% of GDP. 
All these calculations were in terms of the initial GDP. But a country going into a deep crisis 
will typically experience, at least initially, a fall in GDP. Moreover, countries needing external 
financing tend to have lost competitiveness and will need an internal devaluation. This implies 
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that, provided the rest of the euro area sticks to price stability, nominal GDP might have to fall 
considerably before growth resumes. If nominal GDP has to fall by 20% the debt ratio at the 
end of the adjustment process would be 125 * 1.2 or 150% of GDP. 
These considerations suggest a number of policy conclusions: 
 There would have to be a standstill for debt service payments when a programme is 
launched for a country with very high initial debt (this was not the case for Spain or 
Ireland). 
 Countries with high debt ratios should be induced to have longer average maturity. 
(Government) debt management is considered a purely national prerogative. Yet in a 
crisis the structure of public debt becomes a key issue for the entire area. The 
incentives are therefore not properly aligned: in the run-up to a crisis the country 
usually starts issuing shorter-term debt because it wants to avoid locking in high-risk 
premia for a long time. If everything goes well this will have been the right choice. 
However, if the crisis deepens and the ESM has to intervene, the risk will be transferred 
to the euro-area taxpayer. 
 Banks should not be allowed to hold large amounts of the debt of their own 
government. This would be in the interest of their country, as substantial holdings of 
government debt could lead to EMU exit in the case of a restructuring of government 
debt (see Appendix 2). 
Finally, more thought should be given to how to measure public debt ratios. Any 
overvalued domestic price levels should be taken into account in assessments of debt 
sustainability. Accordingly, we propose to limit access to ESM funding in the way 
described in the main text. Table A1 provides an illustration of the resulting access 
limits. 
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Table A1. Access limits, based on a multiple of actual ESM quotas 
 
ESM quota  
(€ bn) 
€ bn % GDP Actual total financing received as 
a % of the access limit 
Germany 134.8 404.4         12.9  – 
France 101.2 303.7         13.6  – 
Italy 89.0 266.9         15.9  – 
Spain 59.1 177.3         15.8  23.3 
Netherlands 28.4 142.0         20.2  – 
Belgium 17.3 86.3         20.4  – 
Austria 13.8 69.1         19.8  – 
Ireland 7.9 39.5         14.4  170.7 
Finland 8.9 44.6         20.7   – 
Portugal 12.5 62.3         33.7  125.2 
Greece 14.0 69.9         39.7  371.8 
Slovakia 4.1 28.6         35.4  – 
Luxembourg 1.2 8.7         16.4  – 
Slovenia 2.1 14.9         37.2  – 
Lithuania 2.0 14.2         36.5  – 
Latvia 1.4 9.6         38.4  – 
Estonia 0.9 6.5         30.8  – 
Cyprus 1.0 6.8         35.9  92.4 
Malta 0.4 2.5         25.7   – 
Note: Total financing includes IMF assistance (and for Ireland third-country contributions). 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data and the ESM. 
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Appendix 2. Extreme scenarios: Could restructuring lead to exit? 
Consider again a highly indebted country, where domestic banks hold government bonds in 
an amount equivalent to or larger than their equity. In this case, a haircut on the outstanding 
debt could push banks’ equity capital below the regulatory limit, in turn requiring a 
combination of recapitalisation and bail-in under the rules of the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD). In principle, the Single Resolution Fund would be available for 
funding the recapitalisation. But this is likely to be difficult because the economy of the 
country in question would probably be in a deep recession and the required bail-in might be 
very large. Hence, it is likely that depositors might also face some haircut. The final result 
would be that depositors would lose part of their money, as the government would lack the 
funds to back deposit insurance. 
At the same time, the national central bank might end up with negative capital if it still had 
large amounts of government bonds on its balance sheet (e.g. those acquired under the Public 
Sector Purchase Programme of the ECB). If holdings by the national central bank are not cut, 
the losses the other bond holders have to take will increase. 
Some losses for (domestic) depositors might thus be unavoidable. However, the country in 
question can still choose what forms these losses take. 
If the country remains in the euro, capital controls would become necessary and the losses of 
bank creditors would follow the BRRD rules – with holders of bank bonds and large depositors 
experiencing near total loss and some more moderate losses for smaller deposits (those below 
€100,000). 
The alternative would be to exit the euro and lower the real value of existing deposits (and 
other bank liabilities) through a combination of devaluation and inflation. This could be done 
in two ways: i) unilateral default through redenomination of all euro debt, or ii) mutually 
agreed debt reduction via redenomination. 
A country opting for the first way would face the wrath of its private and public creditors. 
Fortunately, the times when such wrath led to military action are over, but the country would 
immediately become a pariah in political, economic and financial affairs. Of course, EU 
membership and any benefits going with it would immediately end. No rationally thinking 
administration would choose this way, but it cannot be completely excluded. It could happen, 
if political decision-makers acted irrationally, miscalculated or for any other reason failed to 
take the steps needed to prevent the catastrophe. 
A country could go the second way if its political leadership and its creditors mutually agreed 
that even after debt restructuring continued membership of the EMU would not be viable. 
The case of ‘private sector involvement’ in Greece, where the debt to private investors 
experienced a haircut by nominally 53.5%, showed that such agreement is possible, when 
both the debtor and the creditors believe that this is the best way forward for both sides. 
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Public creditors acting in good faith should be able to act accordingly (which, unfortunately, 
they failed to do in the case of Greece).  
Debt reduction through redenomination of course only makes sense when countries suffer 
from an ingrained loss of competitiveness on top of insolvency. Experience has shown that a 
nominal devaluation might be easier and quicker than an ‘internal devaluation’ through a cut 
in nominal wages and prices. Exiting the euro, coupled with a large devaluation, might provide 
a boost to the economy and indirectly strengthen the banking system. In the case of Greece, 
the discussion about exit occurred, but it was years after the start of the programme when 
domestic prices and wages had already fallen by over 20-25%, thereby eliminating most of the 
competitiveness gap that had been identified initially. This is why it should not be excluded as 
an option beforehand. 
The choice of whether or not to exit the euro should thus not depend on the size of the public 
sector debt overhang (which can be dealt with by debt restructuring within the EMU), but 
rather on the need for an improvement in competitiveness. (We concentrate here on the 
economic considerations. Exiting the euro is obviously a measure of the highest political 
importance and political considerations might override economic ones.) 
At any rate, even if euro exit is agreed by all sides as the best way forward, the common 
currency could still play a key role through the establishment of a ‘safe euro deposit’ at 
commercial banks, where the euro deposits of customers would be fully backed by the 
reserves that banks hold at the ECB. Thus, the euro could also be used for non-cash payments 
in addition to its use for cash payments. The country would remain in the EU and its residents 
would have the option to continue to use the euro as a means for cash and non-cash payments 
and as a store of value, keeping open the way for a return to euro-area membership. 
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